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Since the Vietnam War, Congress has increasingly
asserted itself in U.S. foreign policy, including security
assistance relationships with Third World nations. This has
led to significant conflict between the executive and
legislative branches, and the need to explain Congressional
voting behavior on security assistance. Using 15 cases
including aid to the Contras and El Salvador during the
Reagan presidency, this thesis investigates the relative
impact of various factors on Congressional support for
security assistance, including public opinion and the level
of Soviet bloc assistance. The research concludes that the
most powerful determinant is the Third World government










D. OUTCOME VARIABLE 10
E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 11
F. CONTROL VARIABLES 15
G. THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS 18
H. CASES 19
I. CONCLUSIONS 38
III. EL SALVADOR 41
A. BACKGROUND 41
B. THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS 42
C. HYPOTHESES 49
D. METHODOLOGY 50
E. OUTCOME VARIABLE 50
F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 51






IV. SUMMARY OF NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR CASES 8 3




A. SANDINISTA BEHAVIOR 89
B. OTHER FACTORS 90
C. PREDICTION 91
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND
POLICY PLANNING 92
LIST OF REFERENCES 93




Who determines how security assistance is used by the
United States to promote its national interest in the Third
World? Is it the executive branch, or is it Congress? Cer-
tainly, the answer is both. The President formulates U.S.
foreign policy concerning a Third World nation and then
submits to Congress any requests he may have for arms trans-
fers to that nation in support of his policy objectives.
Congress will then approve or disapprove all or part of the
request, and it may place conditions on the aid. Not all
arms sales proposals require congressional approval, and the
President can bypass Congress by using the presidential
emergency powers to grant aid. However, for grants or
credits or loans, the President has to attain congressional
budget approval, except in declared emergencies. For those
Third World nations considered important to U.S. national
security, military aid is usually given in the form of
grants, credits, or loans. [Ref. l:p. 45]
The bitterness of the Vietnam War and the Watergate
scandal brought about the situation that exists today in
which Congress mistrusts the presidency. After Vietnam,
Congress took steps to regain its constitutional powers to
control the budget and declare war. The War Powers
Resolution of 1974 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976
are two examples.
The changes made in Congress signaled a desire for
greater control and oversight of foreign policy by Congress.
The impact of the "new" Congress was felt most sharply in
U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World. Some of the
manifestations of Congress 1 effort to gain more control of
foreign policy include the following: the 1975 cut-off by
Congress of covert operations in Angola and the Church
Committee's investigation of CIA involvement in the under-
mining of the Allende government in Chile. [Ref. 2:p. 37]
Arms transfers, historically a tool used by the
President to support foreign policy, have recently come
under closer scrutiny by Congress. For example, the Foreign
Assistance Act (passed originally in 1961) , now requires the
President to suspend U.S. assistance to any drug producing
country that fails to take adequate measures to prevent
drugs from being smuggled into the U.S. Also, no security
assistance may be given to any country that consistently
violates internationally accepted standards of human rights.
And, no assistance can be given to any country that delivers
or receives nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or
technoloqy, unless it is placed under international
supervision. [Ref. 3:pp. 65-75]
Also,, the Arms Export Control Act was passed in 1976.
It prohibits FMS sales, credits, and guarantees for one year
to any country that aids or abets international terrorism.
It also requires the President to report annually to
Congress in detail on current military transfer programs.
It is this new congressional interest in arms transfers
to the Third World that will be scrutinized in this
research.
A. HYPOTHESES
This research investigates the relationship between
congressional support (the outcome or dependent variable)
for security assistance and the following independent
variables:
- Soviet bloc military assistance to the opposition;
- reductions in the U.S. foreign aid budget;
- the military success of the U.S. clients;
- U.S. public opinion;
- changes in the administration's policy;
- Third World government behavior as perceived by
Congress.
The hypothesis believed to be the most powerful is that
Congress uses security assistance to influence the behavior
of some government, the last hypothesis listed above. The
government in question does not necessarily have to be the
potential recipient of the proposed security assistance
package (i.e., the Sandinista government in the Nicaragua
case study)
.
The hypotheses represented by the variables listed above
were chosen to be tested in this research, because it seemed
logical to the researcher that each of the listed indepen-
dent variables had a relatively high probability of being
correlated to the outcome variable. For more information
concerning hypotheses about security assistance transfers
from the U.S. to the Third World nations, refer to Noel
Koch's work. [Ref. 1]
Influence, for the purpose of this study, does not
necessarily refer to the situation in which Congress might
tell a prospective Third World client that it will approve
an aid package for that nation if it agrees to vote with the
U.S. in the United Nations. It could mean that, of course,
but the term could also be used to describe the situation
where arms transfers are used as either "carrots" or
"sticks." In such a case Congress would reject a proposal
for security assistance to a client government that acted in
some manner to anger the wrong people in Congress. Certain-
ly, emotional responses by Congress are not excluded from
this definition of influence.
B . METHODOLOGY
Four Third World nations were chosen as the cases for
this study: Nicaragua; El Salvador; Chile; and Pakistan.
All four countries have been recipients or prospective
recipients of U.S. security assistance during the Reagan
presidency. For Nicaragua and El Salvador, a rigorous
methodology is used to test the main hypothesis. The
discussions on Chile and Pakistan are intended to support
the findings of the Nicaragua and El Salvador cases. By
moving the study outside of Central America, more credibili-
ty is given to the ability to generalize from this research.
The period of President Reagan's term in office (1981-
1989) was chosen for two reasons. First, Reagan is the
current President which makes the results of this research
more applicable and familiar to the reader. The second
reason is that Reagan's arms transfer policy with respect to
each country has remained constant throughout his term in
office. This controls for any shifts in his foreign policy.
Although the application may differ slightly for each
case, the same basic methodology was applied in all cases.
A content analysis in which the broad issues were surveyed
formed the backbone of this research. By reading through
the pertinent congressional hearings and other congressional
sources for each case, the orientation and attitude of
Congress on several key dimensions was determined. The
methodology used did not require a strict count of certain
key words or phrases used during each hearing; a content
analysis by issue was employed to determine what behavior
pleased or upset Congress.
In general, this research will employ the controlled
comparison strategy outlined by Alexander L. George [Ref. 4]
The focus will be on aid to two specific countries,
Nicaragua and El Salvador, using 15 specific votes as cases.
A more intensive analysis of the variables is possible since
the paper is not trying to examine a large number of diverse
countries. In each of the cases, the phenomenon to be
observed is congressional support for security assistance to
Third World nations considered important to U.S. national
interests. In addition, this research develops a
methodology that can be applied to any current or future
case, irrespective of geographic area.
II. NICARAGUA
A. BACKGROUND
In 1979, the Nicaraguan government of President
Anastasio Samoza was overthrown. The Sandinista Liberation
Front (FSLN) , a group of leftist guerrillas, moved into
Managua and formed a new coalition government. That same
Sandinista government is currently in power with Junta
Coordinator Daniel Ortega now as President.
Since 1981, the United States has been involved in a
covert military assistance relationship with anti-Sandinista
guerrillas known as "Contras." The covert assistance was
started by President Reagan as a response to allegations
that linked the Sandinistas to leftist guerrillas in El
Salvador and evidence that implicated them in human rights
violations. The presence of Cuban and Soviet military
advisors in Nicaragua led the Reagan administration to
believe that Nicaragua was moving in the direction of
becoming another Soviet proxy, much like Cuba.
During Reagan's term as president, Congress has voted
over 20 times on issues concerning U.S. foreign policy
toward Nicaragua. A recent vote on February 3, 198 8
resulted in a congressional rejection of a $36.25 million
request for Contra military aid. More recently, as a result
of the Sandinistas violation of the provisions of the Arias
peace plan, the issue of renewing military aid to the
Contras surfaced again in Congress. On August 10, humani-
tarian aid was approved with the possibility of a follow-on
vote in late September or early October on a military aid
package for the Contras. This will be discussed in more
detail later in the "forecasting" section of this paper.
During the span of his presidency, President Reagan has
experienced both support and opposition from Congress in
regard to his foreign policy stance toward Nicaragua. What
factors seem to be most critical in determining whether or
not Congress supports Reagan's Contra military aid?
B. HYPOTHESES
The hypothesis believed to be the most powerful in this
case study is that Congress supports military aid to the
Contras as a reaction to some behavior of the Sandinista
government perceived as unacceptable by Congress. This
research will also test for a relationship between support
for military assistance and five other independent varia-
bles: President Reagan's Policy; Soviet bloc military
assistance to the Sandinista government; U.S. budget cuts;
the military success of the Contras; and U.S. public opin-
ion. The relationships between the six independent
variables and the outcome variable will all be considered as
alternate hypotheses.
C . METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in the Nicaragua case is very
straightforward. Nine cases were selected where Congress
voted on the issue of Military aid to the Contra rebels.
Along with the nine cases in which Congress voted, one "non-
case" was selected in which a vote never took place, making
a total of ten cases. The "noncase" will be explained
later. A list of the cases, all between the 1981-1988
period, appears below in Table 1.
TABLE 1
CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON CONTRA MILITARY AID
(PLUS NONCASE)
1. 18 December 1982
2. 18 November 1983
3. April-June 1984:
4. 2 August 1984:
5. 23 April 1985:
6. 12 June 1985:
7. 25 June 1986:
8. 18 March 1987:
9. September 1987:
10. 3 February 1988:
Dodd Amendment
$24 Million Covert Aid
Additional $21 Million for 1984
Ban on 1985 Aid to Contras
Request to Resume Aid to
Contras
Aid Resumed
$100 Million Aid Approved
Moratorium on Remaining $4
Million Voted Down
"Noncase"
$36.25 Million Voted Down
For some of the cases above, there is a boundary
problem. When does the period for each case start for the
purpose of assigning values to the independent variables?
For this case study, the researcher argues that the problem
only exists for the Soviet military assistance variable.
The dates of all the public opinion polls are known, and the
dates of all fiscal year appropriations legislation are
known. What are not known, for most of the cases, are the
dates that the Soviets delivered shipments of military aid
to Nicaragua. Jane's Defense Weekly listed the month of
delivery for some of the shipments, but not most of them.
There is no problem assigning values for the cases that
occurred in the beginning months of a new year or the last
couple of months of a year, since the data for the entire
calendar year can be applied to any such case. For the
cases that occur in the middle of the year (i.e., June-
August)
,
some interpolation is required.
D. OUTCOME VARIABLE
Support for Contra military aid is the dependent
variable selected for this study. Support is very easily
measured by looking at congressional records to see what
legislation passed and what legislation did not. Congress
either said "yes" or "no" to Contra aid requests, which
means that the reliability of the measurement is unquestion-
ably very high. It should also be pointed out that it would
be impossible to find a more valid gauge of support for
10
Contra military aid than actual congressional votes on the
issue.
E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Six independent variables were chosen for this analysis:
President Reagan's Policy; Soviet bloc military assistance
to the Sandinistas; budget constraints; military success of
the Contras; U.S. public opinion; and perception of
Sandinista behavior. The six independent variables were
chosen because they represent the variables most likely to
have a significant relationship with the dependent variable,
congressional support.
The data that represent Soviet bloc military assistance
were obtained from various sources including USACDA figures,
SIPRI data, and tables in Defense and Foreign Affairs .
Figure 1 is a graph prepared by the CIA to support President
Reagan's military aid requests. It was presented to the
U.S. Senate on February 27, 1986.
The values for 1986 and 1987 are estimates based on
figures quoted in the 1986 and 1987 issues of "Soviet
Military Power," which is published by the Department of
Defense. The value for 1986 seems high, but it includes
1,200 vehicles delivered to Nicaragua in 1986 for military
use. [Ref. 5;p. 143] The dollar value estimates shown on
the graph are nearly identical to the corresponding yearly
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Figure 1. Soviet and Cuban Aid to Nicaragua
Transfers , a product of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency (USACDA)
.
This research uses dollar values, the same measurement
reference used by Reagan's administration to lobby support
from Congress, to describe levels of Soviet military assis-
tance. Included in the test of the individual cases,
though, will be a description of the weapons types delivered
to Nicaragua. The reason for this is to assess the military
capability of the transfers, in addition to their dollar
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value. The delivery dates in most arms transfer data
sources are given only by the year of delivery. Defense and
Foreign Affairs has estimates down to the month of delivery
in some cases.
The perception of Sandinista behavior, the second
independent variable, is somewhat more difficult to
operationalize. There is no convenient way to set up a
grading system that will distinguish between small varia-
tions in the behavior of a government. Any such grading
system would be too arbitrary, making it subject to greater
bias. Therefore, this research will treat behavior in a
general context. By studying the related hearings, a reader
can quickly determine Congress' reaction to some action
taken by the Sandinista government. This research can
accurately classify Sandinista behavior as "acceptable" or
"unacceptable" for each case.
"Acceptable" behavior, in general, will include such
actions that would indicate to Congress a move toward a real
democracy, a better human rights record, or regional peace
with other Central American neighbors. "Unacceptable"
behavior will include acts of internal suppression, aggres-
sion against neighboring countries, and moves toward
communism.
In testing for a relationship between congressional sup-
port and budget constraints, the third independent variable,
a broad-brush approach was employed. The congressional
13
hearings on Contra aid and fiscal year appropriations were
surveyed for any data or rhetoric that would tie cutbacks in
the defense and intelligence budgets to support for military
aid requests.
The fourth independent variable, military success of the
Contras, has to do with how well the Contras performed in
pressuring the Sandinistas into adopting democratic ideas
and institutions. Statements made during congressional
hearings concerning Contra performance were used to support
any conclusions made in the study.
The fifth independent variable is U.S. public opinion
concerning the administration's handling of the Nicaragua
situation. Public opinion has already been measured by
Gallup Polls. These polls will form the basis of any
conclusions made about public opinion's relationship to
congressional support.
The final independent variable is President Reagan's
policy toward Nicaragua. By observing any shifts in the
administration's policy and goals toward Nicaragua, this
research will determine whether or not shifts in Reagan's
policy, if there were any, caused corresponding shifts in




During the process of researching the independent
variables, the following ones were recognized as control
variables. A control variable remains constant during the
period being researched.
1. Reagan ' s Pol icy
President Reagan's commitment to military aid for
the Contras is the control variable in this case study.
Reagan's hardline policy toward Nicaragua has been extremely
constant over the course of his presidency. This is very
easy to see by doing a content analysis of different
speeches made by Reagan concerning Nicaragua throughout his
term. On March 8, 1986, for example, Reagan called the
Sandinistas a "cruel clique of deeply committee communists
at war with God and man from their very first days." [Ref.
6:p. 602] This kind of rhetoric has flavored statements
made by Reagan concerning the Nicaragua issue ever since he
took office. For instance, right after he took office in
1981, President Reagan charged the Sandinistas with seeking
to establish a Marxist state under the influence of Cuba and
the Soviet Union. [Ref. 7:p. Ill] He then suspended
President Carter's economic aid program directed toward
Nicaragua. In an April 1983 speech to a joint session of
Congress, Reagan defended his policy toward Nicaragua by
saying "it has treated us like an enemy." [Ref. 7:p. 126]
Shifts in Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua cannot be the
15
cause of fluctuations in congressional support for Contra
military aid during his presidency, since there were no
shifts. The administration's policy never changed.
2 . Military Success of Contras
While the Contras stated their objective to be the
overthrow of the repressive Sandinista government, the
Reagan administration said that its objective in giving aid
to the Contras was to pressure the Sandinistas into moving
toward a democratic Nicaragua. [Ref. 2:p. 47] Congress
would have no part of supporting any covert operation of
which the goal was to overthrow another government.
Senator Cranston, D-California, best summed up the
military success of the Contras with the following statement
made in February 1986:
The United States has been supporting the Contra
effort for more than 4 years now. Our government has
nurtured it, we have orchestrated, we have manipulated it.
What do we have to show for these efforts? Have the
Contras seized and held one square foot of Nicaraguan
soil? Have the Contras spurred an increase in press and
religious freedoms inside Nicaragua? Have they weakened
the popular base of support for the Marxist Sandinista
regime or reduced its reliance on Moscow?
No. [Ref. 8:p. 4]
The hearings do not address the issue of Contra
military success very much. The strength of the Sandinistas
made a military overthrow of the government by the Contras
nearly impossible. Even with no available data, Contra
military success was obviously at a constant low. Military
success therefore becomes a control variable.
16
3 . Budget Constraints
There are no data available at the level of this
research that gives the figures for the yearly Intelligence
budget for the U.S. Since Contra aid came primarily from
the Intelligence budget, the yearly fluctuations of the
Intelligence budget cannot be observed and compared to
support of Contra aid.
A way to justify calling "budget constraints" a
control variable is to compare fluctuations of Contra aid to
fluctuations of a parallel military aid program that was
similar to the U.S. support of the Contras. In this case,
U.S. support of the Afghan rebels would be a good parallel
program to observe.
If "budget constraints" was the most powerful factor
in influencing congressional support of security assistance,
then it follows that Afghan rebels would have also been
severed from U.S. aid in 1984 when the Contras were dropped
as clients by Congress. Of course, the Afghan rebels still
received their full share of aid, which means that Congress
was not equally cutting off aid to rebel groups supported by
the U.S.
Now that the competing hypotheses and variables have
been explained, this paper will proceed with the discussion
of the overall debate regarding military aid to the Contras
and the selected cases for Nicaragua.
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G. THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS
Human rights, political oppression, and the threat of
communism dominating Nicaragua were the themes most
freguently addressed in Congress, but the main issue with
respect to Contra military aid was the means used to attain
U.S. foreign policy goals.
Congress was very uneasy about supplying arms to guer-
rillas who were seeking to overthrow the leftist government
of Nicaragua. Supporting a government in a war against
rebels was much different than supplying rebel forces in an
attempt to oust an established government. The Boland
amendment of December 1982 made it illegal for the U.S. to
use CIA funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the govern-
ment of Nicaragua." [Ref. 2:p. 25]
The Reagan administration claimed that the goal of
Contra military aid was the interdiction of arms traffic
from Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. [Ref.
2:p. 25] Considering the administration's acknowledgement
that the Contras goal may be to overthrow the Sandinista
government, the lack of progress in the arms interdiction
campaign caused many in Congress during 1983 and 1984 to
seek an end to U.S. covert assistance to the Contras. [Ref.
2:p. 25]
In April 1984 there was an outcry in Congress over
reports of CIA participation in the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors. [Ref. 2:p. 46] This enabled the opponents of
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Contra aid to swing the argument in their favor. In August
1984, both the House and the Senate voted decisively to cut
off aid to the Contras during fiscal year 1985.
In June 1985, Congress voted to resume aid to the
Contras. The debate became more focused on the domestic and
foreign policies of the Sandinistas. President Reagan
pushed Congress hard for support in light of the behavior of
the Sandinistas at the time. He also agreed with Congress
that the goal of providing arms to the Contras was to
pressure the Sandinista government into adopting different
attitudes toward diplomatic negotiations with the
opposition. [Ref. 2:p. 48]
H. CASES
As explained earlier, the competing hypotheses will now
be tested by looking at how each of the independent
variables affected the outcome variable (congressional
support) in each of ten separate cases involving congres-
sional votes on Contra aid.
1. Case #1. 18 December 1982; Dodd Amendment Tabled
a. Summary
On 18 December 1982, the Senate rejected an
attempt to put Congress on record in opposition to aid given
to paramilitary groups in Nicaragua that sought to overthrow
the Sandinista government. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Connecti-
cut, stating that funds should not be used directly or
indirectly after 20 January 1983 to support the Contras,
19
tried to add the amendment to HJ Res 631. Dodd said the
administration's support for anti-Sandinista forces
threatened "a far more expanded conflict than already
exists." [Ref. 9:p. 3114] Despite the fact that the House
had already passed a similar amendment on 8 December 1982,
the Dodd amendment was tabled (killed) by a 56-38 Senate
vote.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
Soviet military aid to Nicaragua actually
started in 1980. From 1980 to 1982 the value of aid went
from $10 million to $40 million to $110 million, which was
about the average value of yearly Soviet aid to Nicaragua
from 1980 to 1987.
During 1981 and 1982, Nicaragua received the
following major military eguipment items from the Soviets:
4 Mi-8 Hip helicopterss; and 50 T-54/55 tanks. Also, by
1982 there were about 1500 Cuban military and security
advisors in Nicaragua, and Cubans were helping Nicaragua
lengthen existing landing strips to accommodate jet aircraft
(i.e., the Mig-21) . Although there was no evidence that
Migs were in Nicaragua at the time, the Reagan
administration argued that the Sandinistas were building an
offensive capability that would be far above the
capabilities of Nicaragua's neighbors. [Ref. 10:p. 43]
Overall Soviet military aid was average.
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c. Sandinista Behavior
Before they assumed power in 1979, the Sandinis-
tas issued a communique dedicated to human rights, civil
justice, and free elections in Nicaragua. The transparency
of those promises was soon to be realized.
Soon after it took power, the new government
announced that elections would be postponed until 1985. In
September 1981, the Sandinistas eliminated the right to
strike, and in January 1982 they forced all opposition off
the radio airwaves.
The above acts of repression are not nearly the
worst acts committed by the Sandinistas during that period.
There have been eyewitness accounts from reliable sources
that claim the Sandinistas attacked nearly 2 Indian settle-
ments along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, viciously
killing many Indians. The Sandinistas used the excuse that
the Indians were being uprooted for development purposes.
[Ref. ll:p. 6]
Congress reacted to the above behavior of the
Sandinistas with strong disapproval. In a discussion with
Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams during a February
1982 hearing on Nicaragua, Senator Dodd had this to say
about the opposition being forced off the airwaves, the
elimination of the right to strike, and other actions by the
Sandinistas:
I was in Nicaragua last month and expressed, along
with several other members of Congress who were there,
21
deep disappointment at the turn of events with regard to
the press and the private sector and the church and other
groups. [Ref. 11 :p. 18]
Senator Helms had the following to say about the treatment
of the Indians by the Sandinista government:
These events seem to transcend all normal bounds of
civilized behavior. The Sandinistas are now consolidating
their power in Nicaragua and they have found the Miskito
Indians to be too independent and too stubborn to suit the
Sandinistas' plans for their subjection. It is a sad
pattern, a pattern all too familiar in lands which have
seen the wholesale eradication of races and classes of
indigenous people who have stood in the way of revolution-
ary, so-called progress. [Ref. ll:p. 2]
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was unacceptable.
d. Public Opinion
No public opinion data exist regarding Reagan's
Central America or Nicaragua policy prior to June 1983. The
Gallup Poll and Editorials on File contain no data for this
period.
Public support? No data.




On 18 November 1983 Congress voted yes to Contra
aid, but no more than $24 million was to be spent from any
combination of intelligence and defense budgets during
fiscal year 1984.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
During 1983, the value of Soviet bloc military
assistance went up to about $140 million for that year as
22
opposed to $105 million for 1982. The major defense items
delivered to Nicaragua during 1983 include the following: 1
AN-12 Cub-A transport; 10 Mi-8 Hip helicopters; 10 T-55
tankss; and 10 ZSU-57-2 AAVs.
Overall Soviet military aid was above average,
c. Sandinista Behavior
In early June 198 3, Nicaragua accused three U.S.
diplomats of being spies and ordered them out of the
country.
During a September 198 3 hearing on human rights
in Nicaragua, many eyewitness testimonies were given to
Congress that related horrible acts of repression committed
against internal groups, especially the Miskito Indians, by
the Sandinista government. In a prepared statement for
Congress, Felice Gaer of the International League for Human
Rights provided a long list of documented violations of
human rights by the Sandinistas: 39 Indian villages were
destroyed in 1982; 14,000 Indians were forcibly relocated in
1982; travel from the camps was severely limited by the
government; and many Indians were beaten and injured. [Ref.
12:p. 34]
Congress denounced the actions of the Nicaraguan
government just prior to the November 198 3 vote on Contra
aid. Congressman Gus Yatron, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International Organizations, had this to
say in regard to the repressive Sandinista government:
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However, the Sandinistas defeated Somoza in the name
of human rights and democracy. Unfortunately, it seems
that the policies of the Nicaraguan Government have not
held up to the promises made to the Nicaraguan people.
Elections have never been held. Restrictions on
press, political, and religious freedoms reflect the
nature of the Nicaraguan Government. [Ref. 12 :p. 1]
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was unacceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Table 2 shows that there was no public support
for Reagan's Central America Policy.
TABLE 2
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 24-27 JUNE, 1983
Reagan's handling of situation in Central America:
Approved Disapprove No Opinion
25% 46% 29%
Public support: No.
3 . Case #3. April-June 1984: Additional $21 Million
for Fiscal 1984
a . Summary
The $24 million previously approved by Congress
for fiscal year 1984 was due to run out in June. In April
1984, Reagan asked Congress for an additional $21 million
for fiscal 1984. The Senate approved the request in April,
but when the bill went to a joint conference, the House
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disapproved. The administration lobbied hard but finally
gave up the hope for another House vote in June.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
1984 was looking to be a big year for Soviet
military aid to Nicaragua. Eventually $250 million in
military aid was delivered to Nicaragua as opposed to $140
million in 1983. Soviet military items delivered include
the following: 6 An-2 transports; 5 Mi-24 Hind-C helicop-
ters; 6 Mi-8 Hip helicopterss; 2 BTR-60 PB APCs; 2 PT-7 6
tanks; and 100 SA-7 Grail portable SAMs. The Mi-24s were
not delivered until November 1984, so they could have no
effect on the outcome of this case.
Overall Soviet aid was above average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
On 21 February, 1984, Nicaragua announced plans
for elections in November. While the plans for an election
in Nicaragua were received optimistically in Congress, the
real reaction on Capitol Hill was to the February mining of
Nicaragua's harbors by the CIA.
Congress was outraged by the mining which caused
damage to several Nicaraguan ships and ships from five other
nations. Congress was so upset because no one in Congress
had been consulted prior to the mining effort. They also
claimed that the administration's mining effort was
escalatory. [Ref. 2:p. 45]
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The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was acceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that there was no public
support of Reagan's Central America Policy.
TABLE 3
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 10-13 FEBRUARY, 1984
Approve Disapprove No Opinion
29% 48% 23%
TABLE 4
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-15, 1984
Military Aid to Central America
Don't Get Involved Give Aid No Opinion
49% 39% 12%
TABLE 5
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 18-21 MAY, 1984








While Reagan's request for an additional $21
million for fiscal 1984 was being refused, work was being
done on fiscal 1985 legislation. Reagan asked for $28
million Contra military aid for 1985. Despite President
Reagan's nationally televised news conference on 24 July in
which he lobbied for continued support for the Contras, the
House approved a ban on any aid to the Contras in fiscal
1985 by a vote of 294-118 on HR 5399.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
Again, this case occurred in the late summer of
1984 which turned out to be a big year for Soviet aid.
Also, the CIA estimated that Cuban military advisors in
Nicaragua had increased at this time to between 3000 and
3500.
Overall Soviet aid was above average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
Nicaraguan leaders met with Secretary of State
George Schultz in June. Part of the reason Schultz went to
Managua was to silence critics who said the administration
was reluctant to negotiate with the leftists. He also hoped
to drum up support for the administration's Contra aid
request.
The strategy backfired because, on 4 June, House
Majority Leader Jim Wright, D-Texas, said that Congress
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should not vote for Contra funds while Nicaraguan leaders
and Secretary Schultz were negotiating. [Ref. 13 :p. 90]
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was acceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Refer to case #3 for data. Same data are used
for case #4.
Public support? No.




President Reagan requested to resume military
aid to the Contras, but the joint resolution was rejected by
the House. Passage of the resolution would have given $14
million of military aid to the Contras for the remainder of
fiscal 1985.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
By early 1985, Nicaragua had just come off its
biggest year yet for deliveries of Soviet military equip-
ment. In October/November 1984, Nicaragua saw the first
shipment of 6 Mi-24 Hind helicopters. Based on terrain
considera-tions, this was the most significant offensive
capability given to Nicaragua to date. [Ref. 14 :p. 211]
Overall Soviet aid was above average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
On 4 November, 1984, elections were held for
president, vice-president and Constituent Assembly. The
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Sandinistas won a majority, and Daniel Ortega became
president.
Despite claims by administration officials that
the Nicaraguan elections were for show only, Congress
adopted a "wait and see" attitude. If Nicaragua was truly
moving to implement democratic reform, it would be best,
Congress felt, to given Ortega the benefit of the doubt.
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was acceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Table 6 shows that there was no public support
of Reagan's handling of Nicaragua.
TABLE 6
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 8-11 MARCH, 1985
Approve Disapprove No Opinion
26% 43% 31%
Public support? No.
6. Case #6. 12 June 1985; House Reversed Itself
a . Summary
On 12 June, the House reversed its 2 3 April
legislation that rejected Reagan's request to resume aid to
the Contras. By passing HR 2577, the House provided $27
million for aid to the Contras until 31 March 1986. The
money was to be used for nonlethal aid only. Only boots,
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clothing, medical supplies, radios, radars, intelligence,
and other nonlethal aid could be provided.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua was at
the same level as it was in April when Reagan's request was
voted down. No major deliveries of military equipment were
reported to have arrived in Nicaragua since November 1984.
Overall Soviet aid was below average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
Less than a week after Congress voted against
Contra aid in April, Nicaraguan President Ortega went on an
aid-seeking trip to Moscow. This action received a lot of
attention in Congress.
Congress was very upset over Ortega's trip to
Moscow. Several Democrats who voted against aid in April
tried to revive proposals for aid. Jim Wright, D-Texas,
said Ortega's "maladroit behavior" caused embarrassment for
some Democrats, because it appeared to confirm Reagan's con-
tention that the Sandinistas were Soviet pawns. [Ref. 15:p.
75] Dave McCurdy, D-Oklahoma, said, "We should not be tying
our own hands while Daniel Ortega is shaking those in the
Kremlin." [Ref. 15 :p. 75] There was also much rhetoric
condemning Ortega's trip during the May hearing on President
Reagan's embargo against Nicaragua.




Refer to case #5 for data. Same data are used
for case #6.
Public support? No.




On 25 June, the House voted 221-209 (HJ Res 738)
to renew full military aid to the Contras. The $100 million
included funds for weapons, ammunition, as well as other
military supplies for the Contras. This legislation marked
the first time since mid-1984 that lethal military supplies
were allowed to be given to the Contras by the U.S.
government
.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
There was a decrease in Soviet bloc military aid
during 1985. The value of military aid in 1985 was about
$100 million.
Overall Soviet aid was average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
On 22 March 1986, Nicaragua invaded Honduras in
pursuit of Contras in their camps. Just two days prior to
the incursion, the House had voted against another Reagan
request for Contra aid.
Congress had mixed emotions in regard to the
incident. During April 1986 hearings on the incursion, most
of the questions asked of administration officials hinted at
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a congressional mistrust of the facts as given by the
administration. Still, Congress did acknowledge that the
border violation by armed Nicaraguan forces did occur, and
the incursion angered many in Congress. House Leader Thomas
O'Neill, a liberal against Contra aid, called Ortega a
"bumbling, incompetent, Marxist-Leninist communist." [Ref.
16: p. 402] This action seemed to have much the same impact
on Congress as Ortega's trip to Moscow. [Ref. 16 :p. 402]
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was unacceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Tables 7 and 8 show that there was no public
support of Reagan's handling of Nicaragua.
TABLE 7
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 7-10 MARCH, 1986
Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels:
Congress Should
Authorize Should Not No Opinion
35% 52% 11%
TABLE 8
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-14 JULY, 1986
Reagan's handling of situation in Nicaragua:








The Senate, on 18 March, rejected a resolution
(HJ Res 81) , 48-52, that would have barred the use of $40
million for Contra aid. The $40 million was money that was
still unused from the $100 million approved in 1986. In
light of the Iran-Contra affair, the resolution was supposed
to put pressure on the Reagan administration to account for
all previous official and unofficial military aid to the
Contras. [Ref. 17:p. 511]
b. Soviet Military Assistance
1986 was by far the biggest year for deliveries
of Soviet military items to Nicaragua. Although the $600
million included about 1200 vehicles, other significant
items were also delivered: 10 Mi-8 Hip helicopters; 15 Mi-
17 Hip-H helicopters; 6 Mi-24 Hind-D helicopters; 20 T-55
tanks; 10 ZSU-57-2 AAVs ; and 50 SA-14 Gremlin portable SAMs.
Overall Soviet aid was above average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
In February 1987, Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias set up conditions for peace negotiations between the
five Central American countries. The main provision was for
a ceasefire between guerrillas and governments in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Also, amnesty for the
guerrillas would be granted within 60 days.
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Congress was getting frustrated by the actions
of the Sandinistas. Some members of Congress were using the
Arias proposal as a reason to oppose further aid to the
Contras. What angered and frustrated Congress was that four
of the five countries were in agreement, except Nicaragua
which refused to negotiate with the democratic opposition,
the Contras. [Ref. 18:p. 462]
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was unacceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Tables 9 and 10 show that there was no public
support of Reagan's Nicaragua policy.
TABLE 9
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 4-5 DECEMBER, 198 6
Aid for Contras:
Should Be Given Should Not No Opinion
29% 58% 13%
TABLE 10
GALLUP POLL: TAKEN 24 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER, 1987
Reagan's handling of situation in Nicaragua:




9. Case #9. September 1987: Noncase
This event could be discussed in the final analysis
of results (conclusions) , but it seems more appropriate to
include it as one of the cases. While this case may bend
the rules of good methodology slightly, it would be




The previous $100 million appropriation of
Contra aid was due to expire on 3 September. President
Reagan was planning to ask Congress for up to $150 million
for another 18 months of continued aid to the Contras.
[Ref. 19 :p. 1892] He ended up not asking for the aid.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
At $50 million, military assistance to Nicaragua
was well below the 1986 value.
Overall Soviet aid was below average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
On 7 August, 1987, the five Central American
countries signed a peace agreement, and Nicaraguan President
Ortega was the first to ask civilian opponents in his coun-
try to nominate candidates for a commission to monitor com-
pliance with the agreement. Also, in August, the government
of Nicaragua allowed La Prensa , the anti-Sandinista news-
paper, to reopen, and anti-Sandinista church leaders were
allowed to return to Nicaragua.
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Congress gave much support to the Arias Peace
Agreement, so the steps taken by Nicaragua toward regional
peace and socio-political reform were applauded on Capital
Hill. President Reagan had been calling on the Sandinistas
to negotiate with their opponents for years, and now that
they moved in that direction, his arguments for continued
aid were weakened considerably. After all, the stated
purpose of aid to the Contras was to force the Sandinistas
to negotiate and reform.
In light of congressional support for the Arias
Peace Agreement and warnings to Reagan not to ask for Contra
aid, Reagan did not ask for more aid. This marked the first
time Reagan did not try to push a request through Congress
when funds were dried up.
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was acceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Table 11 shows that there was no public support
of Reagan's policy in Nicaragua.
TABLE 11
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 24 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER, 1987
Reagan's handling of situation in Nicaragua:









The House voted against Reagan's request (HJ Res
444) , 211-219, to continue U.S. military aid to the Contras.
The $36.25 million was to last through the summer of 1988.
b. Soviet Military Assistance
The estimate for 1987 Soviet bloc military
assistance dropped to $50 million. Possibly, the Soviets
decided to back off a little in Central America, or
Nicaragua did not need much aid after the 1986 Soviet
military aid.
Overall Soviet aid was below average.
c. Sandinista Behavior
On 16 January, 1988, Nicaraguan President Daniel
Ortega issued a statement that ended the state of emergency
in Nicaragua, and he promised to participate in cease-fire
talks directly with the U.S. -backed Contras. The statement
also promised free elections within an established time
period.
On 2 January, Ortega sent a letter to President
Reagan asking that the U.S. abide by the Central American
Peace Plan and stop the flow of aid to the Contras. In
addition to all this, the Sandinistas released a group of
political prisoners a few days prior to the 3 February vote
on Contra aid.
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To Congress, it looked as though Nicaragua was
committed to regional peace and political reform. Every-
thing appeared to be developing in Nicaragua and Central
America just as Congress had hoped it would. Nicaragua gave
Congress no choice but to oppose further Contra military
aid.
The perception of Sandinista behavior was that
it was acceptable.
d. Public Opinion
Table 12 shows that there was no public support
of Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua.
TABLE 12
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 2 3-26 OCTOBER, 1987
Continue to aid Contras or see if peace plan succeeds:
See Whether
Continue Aid Plan Succeeds No Opinion
20% 70% 10%
Public support? No.
Table 13 is a summary of the findings of the
Nicaragua case study.
I. CONCLUSIONS
Based on Table 13, it appears that "public opinion" also
becomes a control variable along with budget constraints,
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Contras, since the public never agreed with Reagan's
handling of the situation in Nicaragua during the research
period.
Of the two remaining independent variables, "perceived
behavior of the Sandinistas" is perfectly correlated to the
congressional support variable on the matrix. All five of
the "yes" votes supporting Contra aid occurred during
periods of unacceptable Sandinista behavior. Likewise, all
five of the "no" votes occurred during periods of acceptable
behavior.
There appears to be no correlation between "Soviet Bloc
assistance" and "congressional support." In three cases
when Soviet assistance was above average, Congress voted
against Contra aid.
Based on the findings, the conclusion of the Nicaragua
case study is that the behavior of the Sandinista government
as perceived by Congress is the most powerful determinant as
to whether or not Congress supports a security assistance
(military aid) package for the Contras. Although many
factors are certainly involved in the process of getting a
security assistance package through Congress, for congres-
sional support of Contra aid, the most important is congres-
sional perception of Sandinista behavior.
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III. EL SALVADOR
El Salvador provides another important example of how
Congress is involved in the process of transferring arms to
Third World countries. Like Nicaragua, it is located in
close proximity to the United States. That is where the
similarities end between the two countries from the stand-
point of an analysis of congressional support for military
aid.
El Salvador differs from the Nicaragua case in one very
important aspect. In the case of El Salvador, the U.S. aid
was given to an established government in order to support
that government's fight against leftist guerrillas trying to
undermine its attempts to form a truly democratic society.
In Nicaragua recall that it was the guerrillas who were
supported by the U.S.
A . BACKGROUND
Starting with the October 1979 coup against General
Carlos Humberto Romero, then President of El Salvador, by
progressive elements in the armed forces, there have been a
series of power shifts in the government of El Salvador. In
March 1984 Christian Democrat Jose' Napoleon Duarte, a
strong U.S. supporter, won the presidential election in El
Salvador. Since then, there have been no leadership changes
in the Salvadoran government other than during the March
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1985 elections in which the Christian Democrats also gained
control of the assembly and municipalities.
Since guerrilla organizations joined forces to form the
Farabundo Marti-Front for National Liberation (FMLN) in
1980, they have been active against Salvadoran government
forces. These leftist guerrillas have received military aid
from the Soviet Union and Cuba via Nicaragua.
Other strong opposition to Duarte ' s government has come
from the extreme right-wing parties led by Roberto
D'Aubuisson, reputed death squad leader. Human rights would
probably suffer greatly under his brand of leadership.
Both Congress and President Reagan have favored a moder-
ate democratic Salvadoran government led by the Christian
Democrats. However, during Reagan's presidency, he and
Congress have not been in agreement on how to deal with El
Salvador. Looking at arms transfers from the U.S. to El
Salvador and the associated issues, one can again see
Congress trying to assert itself in foreign policy matters.
B. THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS
During the 1982-1986 period, the discussion in Con-
gress concerning military aid to El Salvador centered around
different issues than those emphasized by the Reagan
administration. By reading through the El Salvador-related
congressional hearings, it is easy to see where the atten-
tion of Congress was focused. A crude content analysis was
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conducted, in which the type and frequency of questions
asked of administration officials were monitored.
In the case of El Salvador during 1982 and 1983, the
major focus of Congress was on the biannual presidential
certifications. These certifications were required by the
Solarz-Bingham amendment passed by Congress in 1981. The
legislation required President Reagan to certify every six
months that:
(1) the government of El Salvador is making a concerted
and significant effort to comply with internationally
recognized human rights:
(2) the government of El Salvador is achieving substan-
tial control over all elements of the Salvadoran forces in
order to bring to an end the murder and torture of Salva-
doran citizens:
(3) the government of El Salvador is making progress in
implementing economic and political reforms, including the
land reform program:
(4) the government of El Salvador is committed to the
holding of free elections at an early date and has made
efforts to begin discussions with all major factions which
have declared a willingness to search for an equitable
political solution to the conflict:
(5) the qovernment of El Salvador has made good faith
efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the
murders of six U.S. citizens in El Salvador in December
1980 and January 1981. [Ref. 23 :p. 2]
Before President Reagan could give military aid to El
Salvador, he had to certify that the above conditions were
being met.
The requirement for a presidential certification was an
issue in itself. Administration officials, of course,
arqued that Conqress was hamperinq the President's ability
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to conduct effective foreign policy. Reagan also had some
support from Congress on the issue of certification: Repre-
sentative Philip Crane from Illinois gave the following
statement during the February 198 3 hearing on the third
presidential certification on progress in El Salvador:
...I think certification is a bad business. The truth of
the matter is that while I have jealously attempted to
guard prerogatives of the legislative branch of govern-
ment, I think this is one area where one must place confi-
dence in the Commander in Chief, the President of the
United States, in negotiating foreign policy, and there is
a certification process that must go through the minds of
those policy makers within the executive branch before
making recommendations to Congress. . . .And I think the
certification process really potentially at least
restricts the capability of the Chief Executive to make
decisions in that one paramount area of responsibility he
has, and that is to look to the broader interests of these
United States in international affairs. [Ref. 24 :p. 5]
The administration had additional gripes about the
certification process. As stated by Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliot
Abrams in a January 1984 hearing, the administration
believed that the certification requirement had a built-in
incentive for the violent right and left to increase their
activities at certification time in an effort to get the
U.S. to cut its support for the democratic center. Also,
certification failed to ask some key questions about El
Salvador such as whether or not a total aid cutoff would
improve the human rights situation or risk a guerrilla
victory. [Ref. 25:p. 18]
Prior to 1984, Congress typically responded to
criticisms of the certification requirement by saying that
44
it was needed to apply some internal domestic pressure on El
Salvador to become politically and socially more democratic.
[Ref. 24:p. 2]
After 1984, Congress reduced the certification
requirements. The reason fewer restrictions were placed on
aid to El Salvador was a desire on the part of Congress to
show support for President Duarte who won the presidential
election held in May 1984. [Ref. 13 :p. 85]
Some groups sought to have Congress declare Reagan's
1982 and 1983 certifications null and void. For instance,
there were 54 members of Congress who signed a letter to
Reagan asking him to retract his first certification of
February 1982. They asked him to do so because of the great
disparity between what the certification reported as the
facts on progress in El Salvador and what other human rights
organizations reported as the true facts. [Ref. 23 :p. 20]
And in February 1983, Representative Studds submitted a
statement co-sponsored by over 8 Members of the House
calling for the Third certification to be declared null and
void.
The reason for the above actions was that groups such as
the Civil Liberties Union, the Americas Watch Committee, and
the Catholic Church were citing much less favorable human
rights statistics than was the Reagan administration. Also,
there were many eyewitness accounts by Salvadoran refugees
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of brutal acts committed by Salvadoran troops against
innocent civilians.
Administration officials were quick to respond to
accusations that President Reagan was following the letter
of the certification requirement but not the intent. The
administration argued that the requirement was not that the
goals had to be achieved before military aid could be given;
the requirement was that El Salvador had to be making
progress toward the goals. [Ref. 26 :p. 15]
The most important issues to Congress, based on how
often they surfaced in the hearings and debates, were human
rights, elections, and land reforms. From 1982 to 1986 any
talk in Congress about El Salvador was dominated by these
issues.
Much less attention was paid to the issues of Soviet
military assistance to the leftist guerrillas, cuts in the
foreign aid budget, and the military success of the
Salvadoran forces. Congress placed no requirement on Reagan
to certify Soviet support of or Salvadoran victory against
the leftists. And, restrictions on the U.S. foreign aid
budget weren't mentioned until after 1984.
In terms of certification requirements, human rights
held center stage in Congress. The interesting fact is that
human rights died down as an issue after 1984. No require-
ment was levied on President Reagan to certify human rights
in El Salvador after 1984. Assistant Secretary of State for
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Inter-American Affairs Langhorne Motley had the following to
say during the March 1985 hearings on foreign assistance
legislation for fiscal years 1986-1987:
Actually, the interesting part is that the focus is
not that much on it any more, because it's been a
dramatic, dramatic decline since 1981, and nobody's really
arguing that issue any more. It's rare to get a question
on human rights violations in El Salvador these days, as
opposed to a year ago in this forum and in other places,
it would focus totally on it. [Ref. 27 :p. 110]
Usually included in the discussion on human rights, the
Salvadoran government's control over its own forces made for
much controversy. Right-wing elements in the Salvadoran
security forces, which included the notorious "death
squads," were responsible for acts of internal terror that
claimed the lives of many innocent civilians. Four nuns who
were U.S. citizens were murdered by the Salvadoran National
Guard in December 198 0, and two U.S. AFL-CIO land reform
representatives were killed in January 1981. The acts of
terror so touched Congress that the Solarz-Bingham amendment
required President Reagan to certify that significant
efforts were being made to bring those responsible for the
deaths of the U.S. citizens to justice. [Ref. 2:p. 40]
An interesting discussion on the issue of control over
Salvadoran security forces took place during the February
1982 certification hearings. After Congressman Bingham
asked Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders about the
state of government controls over internal violence in El
Salvador, Congressman Dornan interceded. He asked his
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colleagues if they would cut off aid to Canada, Ireland, and
Great Britain because of the acts of terror committed by-
groups internal to those countries but uncontrolled by them.
[Ref. 23: p. 60] Progress in the area of government control
over its security forces remained an important issue to
Congress when it considered aid proposals to El Salvador
throughout the case period.
Free elections and democratic institutions lost momentum
as major issues after Duarte was elected in 1984. Congress
did, however, continue to push El Salvador to improve its
judicial system. They stressed the importance of the
improvement in their deliberations on military aid for El
Salvador.
Land reform held congressional interest over the entire
1982-1986 period, and it remained as a condition on military
aid to El Salvador. Congress believed that the parceling of
land to peasant families would have a major impact on
reducing the poverty level and boosting the economy of El
Salvador.
Finally, Congress sought originally to bring about a
quick political solution to the civil strife in El Salvador
by requiring the Salvadoran government to make good-faith
efforts to enter into discussions with the leftist guerril-
las. By allowing the rebels to present their own candidates
and participate in the upcoming solutions, they would be
given a voice in the governing of El Salvador. As pointed
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out in the first certification hearings of February 1982,
the guerrillas responded by burning down town halls and
threatening to kill anybody with voting ink on his fingers.
[Ref. 23:p. 28]
Even with the resistance to any dialogue between the
guerrillas and the government of El Salvador, Congress
continued to push for a dialogue through 1986. Prior to
1984, the reason Congress required the government of El
Salvador to pursue negotiations was to bring about leftist
participation in the elections. [Ref. 23 :p. 28] After
1984, the military stalemate that existed in El Salvador
forced the realization that a political solution was the
only way to keep the war from dragging out.
C. HYPOTHESES
As in the Nicaragua case study, the idea proposed is
that Congress uses military aid to influence the behavior of
some government. The dependent variable is the level of
approval of security assistance for El Salvador.
The independent variables are: Soviet bloc assistance
to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador; foreign aid budget
constraints; the military success of the Salvadoran armed
forces; U.S. public opinion regarding Reagan's foreign
policy toward El Salvador; behavior of client's enemy
(rebels) ; and perceived behavior of the Salvadoran
government. It is hypothesized, as in the Nicaraguan cases,
that the latter variable is the most important.
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D. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in the El Salvador case study will
differ slightly from that used for Nicaragua. A content
analysis of congressional sources will still be the backbone
of the analysis used to determine the overall attitude in
Congress. Hower, instead of using specific congressional
votes as the case to be studied, though, five fiscal years
(1982-1986) will be used. Since Congress never totally
rejected any of Reagan's requests, there is no clear-cut
delineation between approval and disapproval of military aid
in the case of El Salvador.
As in the Nicaragua case study, all of the selected
cases, the five fiscal years (1982-1986) , occurred during
the Reagan presidency between 1981 and 1988. This allowed
the researcher to control for the political environment
within the U.S.
E. OUTCOME VARIABLE
Congressional support for military aid requested for El
Salvador is the dependent variable. It will be measured
differently than it was in the Nicaragua study.
Instead of the crystal clear method of counting congres-
sional votes, a grading system has to be employed in which
support for a given fiscal year is measured based on how it
compares to the other years in the group of cases. Total
dollar amount approved, percentage of total request
approved, and any restrictions will have to be taken into
50
account in ranking the five years according to the level of
support in each.
There are certainly many ways to operationalize congres-
sional support, but this research will do it by ranking the
five fiscal years that make up the cases from 1 to 5 . The
year that gets ranked number 1 had the lowest level of
support for military aid, and the year that gets ranked
number 5 had the highest.
The amounts of requested and approved military aid were
determined from congressional sources including the Congres-
sional Quarterly Almanac and selected fiscal year appropria-
tions hearings.
F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1. President Reagan's Policy
As in the Nicaragua case study, this research will
take a close look at the changes in Reagan's policy toward
El Salvador to see if any correlation exists between his
policy and congressional support.
2
.
Behavior of Salvadoran Government
As in the case of Nicaragua, it is no easy task to
operationalize the behavior of the Salvadoran government.
Determining degrees of good or bad behavior is so arbitrary
that it would be extremely difficult for the researcher to
keep any biases out of the grading system. To avoid such a
pitfall this study will categorize Salvadoran behavior as
either "acceptable" or "unacceptable" to Congress. The same
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criteria used for categorizing behavior in the Nicaragua
case study will also apply here. Again, by becoming more
general, this analysis should improve the reliability and
validity of the measurement of behavior.
3
.
Soviet Bloc Assistance to the Leftist Guerrillas
Since no published data exist that give the yearly
dollar amount of aid received by the leftist guerrillas, it
will not be possible to handle this variable the same way it
was handled for Nicaragua. It will be discussed as an
alternate hypothesis later in the paper.
4 Budget Constraints
The idea here is to determine if foreign aid budget
constraints had any effect on the level of aid approved for
El Salvador. By researching the foreign assistance legisla-
tion for each fiscal year, any relationship between
constraints and support can be determined. This hypothesis
will also be covered later.
5 Military Success of the Salvadoran Government
There is virtually no hard data in this case by
which military success can be measured. The best that can
be done is to read through the pertinent hearings to see
what was said by DOD personnel, or anyone else, concerning
the military success of the Salvadoran forces against the
rebels.
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6. U.S. Public Opinion
Public opinion data were easily obtained from Gallup
Poll surveys on U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Central
America. The public either approved or disapproved or had
no opinion of Reagan's policy.
7
.
Behavior/Activity of Rebel Forces
What effect did the activity of the leftist rebels
have on the level of congressional support of military aid
for El Salvador? This study will test this alternate
hypothesis, so that the El Salvador case study can be
compared to the Nicaragua case study, in which the primary
determinant of congressional support was believed to be the
behavior or activity of the U.S. client's enemy, the
Sandinista government.
G. CONTROL VARIABLES
As the research was being done, the following indepen-
dent variables were determined to be constant for all cases
and became control variables.
1. President Reagan's Policy
Just as President Reagan has been constant and hard-
line in his foreign policy stance toward Nicaragua, so has
he been toward El Salvador. From the time President Reagan
took office, his administration's stated intention has been
to "draw the line" against communism in El Salvador. [Ref.
2: p. 175] In March of 1983, Reagan warned that the domino
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effect would claim Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama if El
Salvador fell to the communists. [Ref. 7:p. 157]
2 . Soviet Bloc Assistance to Leftist Guerrillas
This research would be incomplete if the relation-
ship between Soviet bloc assistance to the Salvadoran
guerrillas and U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government was not
researched and discussed. Unlike the Nicaragua case study,
there is no substantial published data by which the indepen-
dent variable, Soviet bloc assistance, can be quantified.
In fact, as will be brought up later in this discussion,
there is a good possibility that no definitive evidence
exists within the U.S. intelligence community.
When Congress first started pressing Reagan on the
issue of military aid to the Contras of Nicaragua in 1981
and 1982, the administration said that the primary reason
for the aid was to help the Contras stop the flow of arms to
Salvadoran guerrillas from the Sandinistas. During the
February 1982 hearing on the first certification concerning
military aid to El Salvador, Congress confronted administra-
tion officials with a January 1982 editorial from The New
York Times . The article had the following to say in
response to Secretary Haig's assertion that the flow of
Soviet arms through Cuba and Nicaragua had significantly
increased:
. . .No Cuban "advisors" or sizable caches of Soviet
weapons have been seen by American correspondents in El
Salvador. Nor does the State Department add much weight
when its obviously pained spokesman says: "I don't have
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anything specific for you at the moment other than to
indicate that the statements represent a clear consensus
by those accumulating and assessing data." [Ref. 21:p. 7]
When Congress kept pressing in 1982 to see real evidence of
arms shipments, the administration revised the justification
for Contra military aid to include pressuring the
Sandinistas to keep their promises of democracy as a primary
goal. [Ref. 20:Section II, p. 6]
In June 1984, shortly after defecting from the CIA,
David MacMichael who worked as a CIA analyst from 1981-1983
gave Congress cause to have further doubts concerning Soviet
military aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas. He claimed that
no evidence existed that could link the Soviets or Nicaragua
to the rebels in El Salvador other than the sightings of
small aircraft flying at night from Nicaragua to El
Salvador. Later, an intelligence official confirmed that it
was true that no shipments had been interdicted. MacMichael
said he quite the CIA because of pressure to bend
information to fit policy. [Ref. 20:Section II, p. 6]
Indications are that Congress was very suspicious of
efforts to make the situation in El Salvador out to be an
East-West issue. Certainly, the rise in congressional sup-
port for military aid to El Salvador after 1983 could not be
attributed to increased Soviet aid to the leftist rebels,
since little evidence existed to show that there was any
Soviet assistance at all. The rebels were apparently
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getting what additional arms they needed from the Salvadoran
army. [Ref. 30:p. 53]
3 . Military Success of the Salvadoran Government
Debate concerning the possibility of a decisive
military victory by either the Salvadoran forces against the
leftist rebels or vice versa appeared in two varied phases.
The assumptions of the debate prior to 1984 differed signi-
ficantly from those after 1984.
Prior to 1984, the question that Congress put to
Reagan's administration was how much money was going to have
to be given to El Salvador in military aid before the
Salvadoran forces could totally defeat the guerrillas. When
Secretary of State Haig suggested that outnumbered
guerrillas were beating an American-equipped army, there was
an element of shock. It was hard to believe that a better
equipped army of 18,000 was possibly losing to a force of
about 6000 rebels. [Ref. 21:p. 7]
During the February 1982 hearings on the first
presidential certification concerning military aid to El
Salvador, Senator Zorinsky of Nebraska asked Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders
the following question about how much money would be needed
to defeat the guerrillas: "In order to get it over with, in
order to tell the American people this is not a leech that
has attached itself to our country and that will economic-
ally drain us for many years to come, what is the bottom
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line?" [Ref. 21:p. 30] Mr. Enders answered by saying that
military victory was not the goal. Rather, the goal was to
help the Salvadoran government to prevent the guerrillas
from disrupting the political and social progress. [Ref.
21:p. 30]
As was brought out in the hearing on the third
presidential certification in February 1983, another
incident took place that probably relieved some stress on
Congress concerning the possibility of a leftist victory.
On 9 January, Fidel Castro said in an interview in La Prensa
that the leftist guerrillas could not win militarily in El
Salvador; they would have to win it through negotiation.
[Ref. 22:p. 10]
Beginning in 1984, the Salvadoran army showed signi-
ficant improvements in size, firepower, and proficiency.
The leftist guerrillas responded by reducing the size of its
units, spreading them throughout the countryside, and
rendezvousing the scattered units for large concentrated
operations. The stalemate that resulted ended any talk or
hope of a quick victory by the Salvadoran forces. [Ref.
2:p. 195]
Based on the above evidence, it can be argued that
the possibility of a military victory by either side was not
a factor in determining the level of congressional support
for military aid for El Salvador. Prior to 1984, when
statements were made suggesting the possibility of a rebel
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victory, congressional support for military aid was at its
lowest levels. On the other hand, congressional support was
at its highest levels after 1983 when all concerned accepted
the likelihood of a prolonged civil war. During the period
of this case study, the military situation as perceived by
Congress was constant for both sides.
4 . Behavior/Activity of Rebel Forces
The behavior of the rebel forces, during the period
of this case study, was always perceived to be unacceptable
by Congress. Here was a group of Marxist-Leninist
guerrillas who opposed democracy in El Salvador. In early
1982, the leftist guerrillas even stated that they would
kill anyone who participated in upcoming elections in El
Salvador. [Ref. 23 :p. 237] The threat of a communist
victory in El Salvador is certainly what kept military aid
going to El Salvador, but that threat was constant.
In January 1982, leftist guerrillas attacked
Ilopango Air Force Base in El Salvador, destroying five U.S.
Huey helicopters that had been loaned to El Salvador. This
action prompted President Reagan to send $55.0 million in
emergency military aid to El Salvador. In June 1985, when
four U.S. marines were killed at a restaurant by the
guerrillas, President Reagan did not send emergency aid. He
did not have to; Congress was giving him almost all the aid
he asked for.
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Had Congress truly been following the activity of
the rebel forces, it would have placed an additional
requirement on President Reagan to report to Congress on the
behavior of the rebels. Instead, Congress seemed to be
worried more about the activity of the far right factions in
El Salvador. The certification process dealt with human
rights, control of government forces and death squads, and
free elections. Never did Congress tell the rebels that aid
would be increased unless they stopped trying to overthrow
the government.
H. CASES
1. Case #1. Fiscal Year 1982
a. Summary of Military Aid
Total military aid to El Salvador for fiscal
year 1982 was $82.0 million. A $27.0 million request was
approved by Congress and included in a foreign aid appro-
priations bill (PL97-121) , cleared in December 1981. Reagan
used his emergency "Defense drawdown" power to send an
additional $55.0 million to El Salvador in January 1982 in
response to a guerrilla attack on a military airfield
outside of San Salvador. [Ref. 13 :p. 76]
Reagan later requested an additional $35.0
million for El Salvador in the fiscal 1982 supplemental
(HR6863-PL97-257) . The full amount was rejected.
For fiscal years 1982 and 1983, Congress saddled
the Reagan administration with major certification
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requirements before military aid could be given to El
Salvador. S1196 required the following:
- Certification by President Reagan that the junta in El
Salvador be "achieving substantial control" over its
armed forces
;
- An effort by the Salvadoran government to demonstrate
good faith efforts to begin talks with all major politi-
cal factions to find a nonviolent solution to political
problems;
- Certification by President Reagan that the government of
El Salvador was making a significant effort to comply
with internationally recognized human rights; and
- Free elections to be conducted as soon as possible along
with the ending of extremist violence on all sides.
[Ref. 23:p. 2]
Congressional support ranking for 1982 is 1.
b. Budget Constraints
In order to determine what effect fluctuations
in the foreign aid budget had on the amount of military aid
given to El Salvador each year, this research will simply
observe the increases or decreases in the foreign aid budget
from year to year and look to see if the level of aid to El
Salvador responds likewise. The Defense Department "draw-
down" money used by President Reagan to give emergency
military aid to El Salvador in 1982 and 1984 will not be
included in these calculations, since the money represents
no reflection of budget constraints. Table 14 shows the
change from 1981 to 1982 in the El Salvador military aid





CHANGE IN EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID BUDGET RELATIVE TO THE
CHANGE IN THE TOTAL FOREIGN AID BUDGET: 1981 TO 1982
Percentage (%) Increase/decrease
Foreign Aid Budget from Previous Year
Total: $11,469,221,970 195% increase
El Salvador (Military
Aid): $27,000,000 257% increase
Was there an increase in military aid for El
Salvador to correspond with the increase in foreign aid?
Yes.
Congressional support? Yes.
c. Public Opinion (FY 1982)
Tables 15 and 16 show that there was no public
support for Reagan's El Salvador policy.
TABLE 15
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 2-5 OCTOBER, 1981
Reagan's handling of El Salvador:




GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 12-15 MARCH, 1982
Reagan's handling of situation in El Salvador




There was not very much for Congress to applaud
in the way of developments in El Salvador since the 1979
coup. A review of the February 1982 certification on El
Salvador provides the necessary insight as to Congressional
perceptions in FY 1982.
There were a few key issues that easily
dominated the course of the hearing: the murder of four
American nuns by national guardsmen in December 1981; human
rights violations in El Salvador; and government control of
Salvadoran forces.
The 198 murder of the American churchwomen
caused a great deal of anger in Congress. Congress was
upset enough that a reguirement that the Salvadoran national
guardsmen involved in the killings were being brought to
justice was added to the Solarz-Bingham amendment passed in
1981. During the first hearing on the presidential certifi-
cation, Congresswoman Oakar of Ohio had this to say about
the lack of progress in the investigation: "But I don't
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think we have any real knowledge of whether we are going to
see a trial take place and the actual individuals responsi-
ble for the orders, and so forth, in the near future, to say
the least." [Ref. 23:p. 68]
Related to the issue of the murdered nuns was
the question of Duarte's control over Salvadoran security
forces. Based on the fact that the level of government-
related violence increased from 1980 to 1981, Congress was
upset by Reagan's certification in which he avoided the
issue of control of Salvadoran security forces. Amnesty
International, the Catholic Church, and other groups
attributed most of the 1981 civilian deaths to the right
wing factions in the security forces. Congressman Bingham
had this to say concerning Duarte's control over his own
forces:
One of the key points as far as military assistance is
concerned is whether Duarte is in control of the security
forces. In this very room when he was here I asked him
whether he was in control of the security forces, and he
turned and relayed the question to Colonel Garcia. I did
not think that was a very promising way of handling the
matter. [Ref. 12:p. 57]
As far as human rights were concerned, every
group imaginable, except for administration officials, cited
figures that showed an increase in civilian deaths due to
human rights violations. Many in Congress were upset by
what seemed to be an attempt by the Reagan administration to
gloss over El Salvador's human rights record. In fact, 54
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members of Congress signed a letter asking Reagan to
withdraw his certification.
The perception of government behavior was that
it was unacceptable.
2. Case 2. Fiscal Year 1983
a. Summary of Military Aid
Reagan requested a total of $136.3 million in
military aid for El Salvador in fiscal year 1983: $76.5
million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) loans; $58.5 million
in Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants; and $1.3
million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) aid. Much of the request, $110 million, was
presented to Congress on March 10 as part of an emergency
package of military and economic aid for various Central
American nations.
Congress ultimately approved $81.3 million in
military aid for El Salvador in fiscal 1983. The $81.3
million included the following: $26.3 million in loans and
grants under a continuing resolution (PL97-377) ; $30 million
in "reprogrammed" loans which were transferred from other
countries in April 198 3 with the approval of both Appropria-
tions Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
and $25 million in grants approved in an omnibus fiscal 1983
supplemental appropriations bill (PL98-63) . The amount of
aid approved was about 60 percent of the total requested.
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On 12 May Congress voted to continue the PL97-
113 requirement that Reagan present a statement to Congress
concerning the conditions in El Salvador twice a year. On
top of the restrictions mentioned in PL97-113, Congress
voted to prohibit the president from using his emergency
powers to provide any further aid to El Salvador without
congressional approval.
Congressional support ranking for 1983 is 2.
b. Budget Constraints
Table 17 relates the change in the El Salvador
budget to the change in total foreign aid.
TABLE 17
CHANGE IN EL SALVADOR BUDGET COMPARED TO CHANGE
IN TOTAL FOREIGN AID, FY 1983
Percentage (%) Increase/decrease
Foreign Aid Budget from Previous Year
Total: $11,231,729,565 2% decrease
El Salvador (Military
Aid): $81,000,000 301% increase
Military aid for El Salvador increased while the
foreign aid budget decreased.
Congressional support? Yes.
c. Public Opinion
Tales 18 and 19 show no public support of
military aid for El Salvador.
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TABLE 18
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-14 MARCH, 1983
Should Congress approve Reagan's request for an
additional $60 million in military aid for El Salvador?
Should Should Not No Opinion
22% 68% 10%
TABLE 19
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 29 JULY-1 AUGUST, 198 3
Should the U.S. give military aid to governments in
Central America that are friendly to us?




It is apparent to anyone who reads through the
second and third presidential certifications of August 1982
and March 1983, respectively, how frustrated Congress was
with El Salvador. As in the first certification hearing,
Congress focussed on the issues that required certification
by President Reagan.
Since the first presidential certification in
January 1982, there was no improvement in the human rights
record of El Salvador. During the hearing on Reagan's
second certification, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
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Inter-American Affairs, Congressman Barnes, had this to say
about the human rights situation: "It may be that the
Government of El Salvador is making a concerted and signifi-
cant effort to comply with international human rights. If
that is so, it is not apparent from the result." [Ref.
28: p. 13] Congressman Studds, in a prepared statement
regarding the third certification, brought up the fact that
civilian deaths reported by the State Department amounted to
half the amount reported by the Catholic Church. He also
noted that even the administration admitted that "disappear-
ances remained steady during the past six months, and that
the rate of decline in civilian deaths slowed during the
same period." [Ref. 26:p. 6]
At the time of the third certification, it
appeared to Congress as though the Salvadoran government
still had no control over its own forces. Based on verifi-
able evidence from numerous sources that implicated the
Salvadoran Army and National Police in recent massacres,
kidnappings, and cases of torture, Congressman Studds said
the following: "I do not understand how the Secretary of
State or the President could conclude from this evidence
that the armed forces of El Salvador are putting an end to
the torture and killing of the Salvadoran people." [Ref.
26:p. 9]
The program for land reform, initiated and
supported by Congress, was showing no progress. While
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reviewing Reagan's second certification in the summer of
1982, Chairman Barnes said, "Contrary to what the report
would have us believe, all the information that I get from
the people closest to the land reform program, for example,
is that the program is dead." [Ref. 28: p. 13]
In March 1983, there was still no justice done
in the case of the American nuns who were murdered in 1980.
This upset many in Congress; Congressman Yatron, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organiza-
tions, said, "I also want to express my disappointment over
the latest ruling by the Salvadoran Appeals Court declaring
that there is presently insufficient evidence to bring the
five national guardsmen accused of murdering the American
churchwomen to trial." [Ref. 26 :p. 328]
The only bright spot in the certifications of
progress in El Salvador was the fact that many voters turned
out for the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections. This
may have been overshadowed by the fact that Roberto
D'Aubuisson, reputed death squad leader, became President of
the Assembly. In May 1982, he called a halt to the land
reform program.
The perception of government behavior was that
it was unacceptable.
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3 . Case #3, Fiscal Year 1984
a. Summary of Military Aid
President Reagan originally requested, in
February 1983, $86.3 million in military aid for El Salvador
in fiscal year 1984. Later, in February 1984, Reagan
submitted a supplemental request for $176.7 million on top
of the $64.8 million that had already been approved by
Congress. This supplemental request was part of an aid
package for Central America.
Congress approved a total of $196.55 million in
military aid for El Salvador: $64.8 million in a continuing
appropriations resolution (PL98-151) approved in November
1983; $61.76 million in a supplemental spending bill (PL98-
332) approved in June 1984; and $70 million included in the
final supplemental (PL98-396) approved in August 1984.
Approved aid was about 74 percent of requested aid.
During action on fiscal year 1984 foreign aid
legislation, Congress added two more conditions to those
already placed on military aid for El Salvador. First,
Congress adopted a proposal by Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Penn-
sylvania, to withhold 3 percent of the total aid approved
in the continuing resolution (PL98-151) until Salvadoran
authorities substantially concluded the investigation of the
murder of four American nuns in December 1980. The accused
had to be brought to trial and a verdict reached. Second,
10 percent was to be withheld until Reagan certified that no
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alterations had been made to the land reform program in El
Salvador that would not be in the interest of the intended
beneficiaries of the program.
Congressional support ranking for 1984 is 5.
b. Budget Constraints
Table 2 compares the two budgets, El Salvador
military aid and foreign aid.
TABLE 2
EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID AND FOREIGN AID BUDGETS, FY 1984
Percentage (%) Increase/decrease
Foreign Aid Budget from Previous Year
Total: $11,468,401,636 2% increase
El Salvador (Military
Air): $164,500,000 202% increase
The percentage increase of security assistance
(military aid) was much greater than the percentage increase
of the foreign aid budget.
Congressional support? Yes.
c. Public Opinion
Tables 21 and 22 show no public support of
Reagan's El Salvador policy.
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TABLE 21
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-15 APRIL, 1984
Should the U.S. give military aid to governments in
Central America that are friendly to us?
Give Military Aid Don't Get Involved No Opinion
39% 49% 12%
TABLE 22
GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 18-21, 1984
Reagan's handling of situation in El Salvador:




Based on the content analysis of congressional
sources, there are two phases of Salvadoran government
behavior as perceived by Congress. Key players on the
Foreign Affairs Committees spoke differently on the El
Salvador issue prior to the March 1984 presidential elec-
tions than they did after.
Prior to the presidential elections in El
Salvador, Congress exhibited the same degree of frustration
as in the cases for FY 1982 and FY 1983. During a January
1984 hearing on El Salvador, the same Congressmen who
dominated the certification hearings of 1982 and 1983 seemed
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to be saying pretty much the same things they said earlier
in regard to human rights, death squad activities, land
reform, etc.
During a February 1984 hearing on Henry
Kissinger's National Bipartisan Report on Central America f
Congress expressed concern over the upcoming March election
in El Salvador. The concern was that it might be a victory
of the extreme right if D'Aubuisson won. Already in 1982,
El Salvador was moved further to the right because of the
elections held in March 1982 in which rightwing parties
gained control of the Constituent Assembly. [Ref. 29 :p. 40]
On 6 May, Duarte won the presidency in a runoff
election between Duarte and the rightwing leader Roberto
D'Aubuisson. After he was elected, Duarte met with congres-
sional leaders in Washington in May and July to ask Congress
to give his democracy a chance by giving him the aid he
needed. Duarte also promised Congress that he would respect
human rights, control the military, and begin to implement
the changes Congress had been demanding since 1981. [Ref.
2:p. 42]
Although he was the appointed head of the Junta
government prior to his election as president, Duarte
claimed that during those years he was unable to enforce any
changes, because he was not an elected president. He had
remained the head of the junta so long as he kept the mili-
tary happy. Now, as the elected president, he argued, he
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would be able to force changes in El Salvador. [Ref. 30:p.
2]
Congress was so taken with the moderate Duarte
that it immediately resolved to support his efforts.
Congressman Michael Barnes, Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and a
previous critic of U.S. foreign policy in El Salvador, had
this to say after Duarte' s election: "We'll be a lot more
receptive to requests from Napoleon Duarte than from a
military dictatorship." [Ref. 13 :p. 73] House Majority
Leader Jim Wright said Congress should give Duarte all the
aid he said he needed. [Ref. 13 :p. 73]
Also, shortly after Duarte was elected, five
former Salvadoran national guardsmen were convicted for the
murders of the four American nuns in 1980.
The perception of government behavior was that
it was acceptable.
Before case 4 (FY 1985) is discussed, the
Kissinger Commission's influence on subsequent congressional
support should receive more attention. In 1983, President
Reagan created the bipartisan commission to stifle critics
of his Central America policies. He wanted the commission
to make recommendations to him concerning Central America.
[Ref. 13:p. 70]
The Kissinger Commission concluded in January
1984 that the U.S. needed to act boldly to stem the crisis
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in Central America. Substantial military aid for El
Salvador was one of the commission's recommendations.
Congress adopted only a portion of the recommendations for
increased aid to Central America in a continuing appropria-
tions resolution for fiscal year 1985. Although the commis-
sion's report was a favorable factor in terms of increased
military aid for El Salvador, some footnoted dissents by
Democratic commissioners against some of the recommendations
caused Democrats in Congress to view the report as
"cosmetics for the Reagan policies they opposed." Optimism
generated was due more to Duarte ' s election as president
than White House efforts. [Ref. 13 :p. 70]
4 . Case #4, Fiscal Year 1985
a. Summary of Military Aid
President Reagan requested $132.5 million in
military aid for El Salvador in fiscal year 1985. The
request was submitted for approval in the fiscal year 1985
continuing appropriations resolution (PL98-473)
.
Of the total request, $128.25 million was
approved by Congress: $11.75 million in grants; $15 million
in loans; and $1.5 million for military training. This was
the largest single amount of military aid that the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations had
approved in one package.
All of the previous restrictions levied on
military aid to El Salvador had been lifted. Congress
74
placed only three relatively minor restrictions on military
aid in fiscal year 1985:
- Only half of the Military Assistance Program money could
be spent before 1 March, 1985 unless both the House and
Senate Appropriations committees approved otherwise.
President Reagan had to report to Congress about the
progress made by the Salvadoran government in curbing
"death squad" killings and in conducting discussions
with the leftist opposition before the second half of
the money could be spent.
- $5 million was held in escrow until the Salvadoran
government held a trial and obtained a verdict in the
case of the two U.S. land reform workers who were killed
in January 1931.
- All aid to El Salvador would be suspended if President
Duarte was deposed by a military coup. [Ref. 13: p. 77]
Congressional support ranking for 1985 is 4.
b. Budget Constraints
Table 23 compares the El Salvador military aid
budget to the total foreign aid budget.
TABLE 2 3
EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID BUDGET COMPARED TO THE
TOTAL FOREIGN AID BUDGET, FY 1985
Percentage (%) Increase/decrease
Foreign Aid Budget from Previous Year
Total: $18,190,366,636 58% increase
El Salvador (Military
Aid): $128,250,000 22% increase
Military aid for El Salvador decreased while the




No polls concerning Reagan's handling of El
Salvador, Central America, or military aid to Central
America were taken during 1985. Also, research through
Editorials on File came up negative for any editorials that
might be indicative of public opinion concerning El
Salvador.
Public support? No data.
d. Government Behavior
After Duarte won the presidential run-off
election in May 1984, the situation looked promising to
Congress. Duarte s behavior as President of El Salvador
during the FY 1985 case was no letdown in the eyes of
Congress.
In a dramatic speech delivered to the United
Nations, Duarte called for a meeting with the FMLN-FDR
guerrillas in October. [Ref. 2:p. 184] On 15 October,
1984, the first meeting took place between the Duarte
government and the leftist rebels. A second meeting
followed on 30 November at Ayagualo.
Although no differences were resolved at the
meetings, Duarte did show to Congress that he could act
independently of the pressure put on him by the extreme
right. [Ref. 2: p. 184] Congress had been urging the two
sides to talk since 1981 when the presidential
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certifications included a requirement for the Salvadoran
government to pursue negotiations.
As for human rights, the Americas Watch Commit-
tee had this to say during a January 1985 hearing on El
Salvador:
In the period from 1979 to 1983, in particular, the
security forces were responsible for an enormous number of
disappearances, an enormous number of death squad
killings, and a tremendous amount of torture. .
.
The practices of the security forces have improved
dramatically. [Ref. 30:p. 2]
In wrapping up the 31 January hearing on El
Salvador, Congressman Solarz of New York had the following
to say:
I have the sense, I think, that previous certifica-
tions were as phoney as a $3 bill. I think it would not
be all that difficult to justify some of those certifica-
tions on the basis of the contemporary situation of
Salvador as distinguished from the previous reality.
[Ref. 30:p. 93]
Also, on 31 March, Christian Democrats were
victorious in assembly and municipal elections which gave
them control of 200 of 262 municipalities. The assembly had
previously been controlled by the extreme right.
The perception of government behavior was that
it was acceptable.
5. Case #5. Fiscal Year 1986
a. Summary of Military Aid
For fiscal year 1986, President Reagan requested
$132.6 million in regular military aid for El Salvador.
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$113 million of the requested $132.6 million was approved by
Congress.
On 27 September, 1985, Reagan formally requested
$54 million, which include $12 million for the Salvadoran
police and $10 million for the Salvadoran military, for
Central America. Congress rejected all of the military aid
for Central America but accepted $22 million of the $26
million requested for police aid. The request was intended
to bolster certain police units against internal terrorism.
This was the first time since Congress barred further aid to
foreign police forces in 1974 that such aid had been given.
The surprise of it was the El Salvador received much of the
aid, even with its history of repression by the Salvadoran
police. [Ref. 15:p. 80]
Congressional support ranking for 1986 is 3.
b. Budget Constraints
Table 24 compares the El Salvador military aid
budget with total foreign aid.
TABLE 24
EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID BUDGET COMPARED WITH
TOTAL FOREIGN AID, FISCAL YEAR 1986
Percentage (%) Increase/decrease
Foreign Aid Budget from Previous Year
Total: $15,025,319,945 17% decrease
El Salvador (Military
Aid): $113,000,000 12% decrease
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Again, no data exist for this case. Nicaragua
was the hot foreign policy topic of the polls at the time,
just as in the 1985 case.
Public support? No data.
d. Government Behavior
In February 198 6, a new labor confederation,
Unidad Nacional de los Trabaj adores Salvadorenos (UNTS) , was
formed by peasant organizations, labor confederations, and
unions, including representatives from the Christian
Democratic party and the opposition. The forming of such a
democratic institution sent a signal to Congress that
democracy was making steady progress in El Salvador.
In June, President Duarte proposed a third round
of peace talks with the FDR-FMLN. Also in June, United to
Reconstruct, a program for repopulation of key communities,
was inaugurated. Duarte was obviously trying to negotiate
with his opposition and implement much needed reform in El
Salvador.
Not much was said in Congress about El Salvador
during this period. Congress was happy with the develop-
ments in El Salvador based on the level of aid approved.
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Nicaragua had moved into the spotlight in Congress after
1984.
The perception of government behavior was that
it was acceptable.
Table 2 5 is a summary of the findings of the El
Salvador case study.
I. CONCLUSIONS
It appears that public opinion could become a control
variable as it did in the Nicaragua case study. Still,
there is not enough data to support such a conclusion, and
it is certainly possible that public opinion shifted in
favor of El Salvador after democracy appeared to take hold
in mid-1984.
Of the two remaining independent variables that did not
fall out as control variables, only the behavior of the
Salvadoran government seems to be correlated to the outcome
variable, congressional support. The behavior of the
Salvadoran government was perceived by Congress to be
unacceptable in only two of the five cases that make up this
case study. During fiscal years 1982 and 1983 the behavior
was unacceptable, and congressional support of military aid
was at its lowest during those two years.
Except for fiscal year 1985, security assistance for El
Salvador always increased at a higher rate or decreased at a
lower rate than the overall foreign aid budget. "Budget

































































































variable. The reason fiscal year 1985 is an outlier is due
to the fact that Congress approved a disproportionately high
amount of security assistance for El Salvador, after the
elections in El Salvador. Compared to FY 1984, FY 1985
looks relatively low in terms of dollar amount of aid given.
Like the Nicaragua case study, it appears that the
behavior of the government that Congress seeks to influence
is the most powerful determinant of congressional support.
Therefore, in the El Salvador case study, this research
shows the behavior of the Salvadoran government to be the
most influential factor in determining Capital Hill support
of military aid for El Salvador.
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IV. SUMMARY OF NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR CASES
Congress uses arms transfers to influence the behavior
of Third World governments. This study does not assert that
other factors do not influence congressional support for
proposed arms packages. If behavior was the only considera-
tion, then Congress would have voted against all military
aid for El Salvador during the years in which the govern-
ment's behavior was labeled as "unacceptable." Even during
1982, the year in which El Salvador's behavior was at its
worst, Congress gave President Reagan 41 percent of what he
asked for. The reason for this is that Congress saw in
Duarte and the Christian Democrats El Salvador's best hopes
for becoming a democracy. Giving no aid could have meant a
future victory by the communist left or a coup by the
oppressive right.
What this research does assert is that the level of
Congressional support for military assistance to Third World
nations depends on the behavior of the government involved.
The level of support can be defined by the amount of aid
approved or the conditions attached to the aid by Congress.
Both the Nicaragua and El Salvador case studies substantiate
this assertion. A brief discussion of Chile and Pakistan
will follow in support of these conclusions.
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V. A LOOK AT CASES OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL AMERICA
A. CHILE
A quick look at Chile complements the more in-depth
studies of Nicaragua and El Salvador in a couple of
important ways. First, it adds another case study to the
overall body of research. More important, though, Chile is
outside of Central America, which lends more credibility to
the research and makes the thesis more valid for a varied
sample of Third World countries.
1. Hypothesis
The hypothesis in the discussion of Chile is in
keeping with the main hypothesis of the paper. Specifi-
cally, in the case of Chile, Congress uses arms transfers as






No rigorous methodology is going to be used in the
discussion of Chile. Chile is being used, in this case, as
an addendum to support the conclusions reached in the case
studies of Nicaragua and El Salvador.
3 Discussion
In 1976, Congress banned arms transfers to Chile
headed by General Augusto Pinochet. The ban was imposed due
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to the Pinochet regime's poor human rights record. [Ref.
31:p. 175]
In 1981, at the beginning of Reagan's presidency,
the debate concerning arms sales to Chile opened up again.
Reagan pushed for military aid because he said that such
positive action would encourage political reform in Chile.
Many in Congress were opposed to the aid to Chile,
because they viewed the U.S. ban on military aid as a symbol
of U.S. determination to protect human rights abroad.
Senator Kennedy opposed repealing the ban, because Chile
refused to cooperate in the U.S. investigation of the
September 1976 assassination of former Chilean Ambassador
Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. [Ref. 31:p. 176]
In the fiscal year 1982 and 1983 foreign aid
authorization bill (S1196) cleared in December 1981,
Congress decided to allow U.S. aid or arms sales to Chile if
President Reagan could certify to Congress the following:
that Chile had made significant progress in adopting inter-
nationally recognized principles of human rights; that such
aid was in the U.S. national interest; that the Chilean
government was not involved in international terrorism; and
that the Chilean government was taking steps to cooperate in
the U.S. investigation of the Letelier assassination.
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs acted in May
1984 to toughen the requirements placed on military aid to
Chile in 1981. Two conditions were added to the 1981
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conditions: military aid was banned unless an elected
civilian government was in power in Chile; and the Chilean
government had to agree to extradite alleged Nazi war
criminal Walter Rauff to Israel. Congress had been calling
on Pinochet to hold elections for some time. In light of
his resistance to elections, Congress was acting to pressure
Pinochet. [Ref. 13 :p. 108]
The U.S. situation with Chile looks similar to the
case of El Salvador. The difference is that El Salvador
received more aid with each passing year of Reagan's presi-
dency. The ban on military aid to Chile was lifted in 1981,
but as each year passed, the conditions on any aid to Chile
grew until it was impossible for Chile to get U.S. military
aid. This was due to the Chilean government's refusal to be
pressured by the U.S. Congress. For El Salvador, military
aid became a "carrot"; for Chile, it became a "stick."
B. PAKISTAN
The reasons for including a discussion of Pakistan in
this research are the same as those for including Chile. By
moving the study out of Latin America and over to the Asian
subcontinent, the sample becomes more varied, which lends
more credibility to this research.
1. Hypothesis
Congress uses arms transfers as a tool for influen-
cing the behavior of the Pakistani Government. Again, this
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The methodology is very relaxed in the discussion of
Pakistan, just as it was for Chile. A general discussion is
employed to support the conclusions of the Nicaragua and El
Salvador case studies.
3 Discussion
In 1979, Congress passed the Symington amendment
which barred aid to Pakistan as a result of its efforts to
develop nuclear weapons. In light of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the potential for further aggression in the
Persian Gulf, President Reagan wanted to have Pakistani
assistance in resisting Soviet moves into the Persian Gulf.
He, therefore, proposed a six-year $3.2 billion aid package
for Pakistan and a waiver of the Symington amendment. [Ref.
31:p. 172]
Congress accepted Reagan's proposal, but only after
Senators Glenn and Helms got an amendment passed that would
ban U.S. aid to any non-nuclear country that exploded a
nuclear device. The amendment was designed to back-up the
U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. [Ref. 31:p. 175]
In 1982, Congress passed a Senate-originated provi-
sion that would end military sales and aid to Pakistan if it
transferred sensitive U.S. military equipment to a communist
nation. This provision was sponsored by Senator Glenn in
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response to the administration's decision to install
advanced radar warning equipment on the F-16s that Pakistan
was buying from the U.S. [Ref. 32:p. 246]
In October 1983, Congress passed an amendment by
Paula Hawkins, R-Florida, that would suspend all aid to
countries that failed to crack down on narcotics production
and export. Pakistan was the world's second-largest
producer of opium after Iran. President Reagan was required
to submit an annual report to Congress stating that
projected reductions in production and trafficking of drugs
were met for the previous year and would be met for the
following year.
In March 1985, an amendment was adopted that would
bar aid to any country that attempted to illegally obtain
U.S. material or technology to build a nuclear weapon. The
amendment also required President Reagan to suspend all aid
if Pakistan obtained a nuclear weapon.
The case of Pakistan provides another good example
of how Congress uses arms transfers to influence the
behavior of its Third World clients. In this case, Congress
used arms to influence attempts by Pakistan to obtain a
nuclear weapon and government policies concerning drug
production and trafficking. Military aid was given origi-
nally to boost the West's strategic position in the Persian
Gulf, but Congress used it more as a tool to influence the
government of Pakistan as time passed.
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VI. FORECASTING
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there has been
renewed talk on Capital Hill about the possibility of giving
military aid to the Contras again as a result of activities
in Nicaragua starting in June 1988. On 10 August, the
Senate approved, 49-47, a Democratic-sponsored plan that
would give humanitarian aid to the Contras starting 1
October, with the possibility of a military aid vote later
in the fall. By applying the general methodology developed
in this research, this research will now look at the key
indicators in this current case and make a prediction.
A. SANDINISTA BEHAVIOR
In March 1988, the Contras and the Sandinistas signed a
ceasefire agreement and started negotiating on political
reforms in Nicaragua per the Central American Peach Agree-
ment signed last 7 August. On 9 June, the Sandinistas
became unwilling to make any more concessions, so the peace
talks broke down. [Ref. 33: p. 2 036]
On 10 July, the Sandinistas broke up a political demon-
stration, jailed dozens of opposition leaders, and closed
the anti-Sandinista newspaper, La Prensa . On top of that,
the Sandinistas expelled U.S. Ambassador Richard Melton and
seven others, alleging that Washington was encouraging
opposition activity. [Ref. 33 :p. 2036]
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Congress reacted on 13-14 July, when both houses over-
whelmingly passed resolutions condemning the Sandinista
oppression against internal political opponents and the
expulsion of eight U.S. diplomats. This was the strongest
congressional reaction ever to be the behavior of the
Sandinista government. [Ref. 33 :p. 2036]
B. OTHER FACTORS
There is a U.S. presidential election coming up in
November, and the politics involved are affecting the
Contra-aid issue. Presidential nominee Michael Dukakis
opposes Contra-aid, but his running mate, Senator Lloyd
Bentsen, supports it. The Democrats united on 10 August in
getting Senate approval, 49-47, for their plan largely
because of the Dukakis-Bentsen split. [Ref. 34 :p. 2285]
The Democrats had hoped that Contra aid would not be a
partisan issue in the November elections, but the Republi-
can's unanimous vote against the humanitarian aid package
destroyed that hope. The Republicans are hoping that the
Contra aid issue will give them a lot of leverage in the
South, where fears exist that a communist takeover in
Central America will mean many more immigrants. [Ref. 34 :p.
2285]
Another factor to take into consideration is that the
Contra leadership has undergone some changes. During the
last week in July, Col. Enrique Bermudez was elected to the
seven-member directorate, the leadership of the Contras.
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Bermudez is a former member of Somoza's National Guard,
known for its atrocities. The concern in Congress is that
the Contras might be another version of Somoza's fascist
regime. [Ref. 35: p. 31]
C. PREDICTION
Although the election year politics put a different
slant on this case, this paper predicts that, barring a
change in the current situation, Congress will approve
military aid for the Contras later in the fall.
Congressional reaction in this case was stronger than it has
ever been in regard to the behavior of the Sandinistas.
Assuming that Sandinista behavior is the most powerful
determinant as to whether or not Congress supports military
aid, it is unlikely that military aid will be voted down.
The Democrats who voted against military aid in February in
support of the Central American Peace Plan have undoubtedly
been embarrassed by the recent Sandinista oppression. They
will vote for military aid as a hedge against future
Sandinista misbehavior.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
AND POLICY PLANNING
The controlled comparison strategy as applied to the
case studies included in this research is not new, and there
is certainly the possibility that the operationalization of
the variables is not optimum. So what is the value of this
research?
Hopefully, by providing the analyst or planner with a
structured way of looking at a prospective Third World
client or security assistance package, this research will
enable a planner or analyst to make a logical prediction as
to how Congress will react. Such knowledge would better
enable a planner to put together and present a security
assistance proposal to Congress with a higher confidence of
getting congressional approval.
It is always possible to think of alternate hypotheses
that might better explain a phenomenon, congressional
support for security assistance in this case, than the
researcher originally did. The importance and utility of
this work is that new variables can easily be introduced
into the methodological process developed in this paper. By
introducing any new variable that might explain
congressional support of security assistance for a
particular case, nothing is taken from the ability of a
planner or analyst to generalize using the same approach.
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